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I. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
There are effectively no material facts in dispute on appeal. The only legitimate dispute is
the identity of the trier of fact, and how the undisputed facts apply to the remedies available under
the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act (“IPPEA”). Although Smith objects to many of
GFHD’s attempts to mischaracterize the undisputed facts and events established in this matter, all
material facts are substantiated by physical documents in the record, or are subject to the
uncontroverted testimony of the witnesses at trial.
It is undisputed that both Smith and GFHD made demands for trial by jury in their
respective Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, R. Vol. I, p. 645-49, and Answer to Plaintiff’s
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, R. Vol. I, p. 650-54. There is no dispute both parties
stipulated to a trial by jury, and that the district court’s Scheduling Order was entered February
14, 2017, ordering a jury trial pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. R. Vol. I, p. See R. Vol. I, p. 65658, 660. There is no dispute that the February 14, 2017 Scheduling Order was in effect before trial,
during trial, and after the jury trial ended. The district court’s Memorandum Decision and Order,
which was the only order addressing the issue of trial by jury after the initial Scheduling Order,
was entered more than three months after the jury trial ended. See R. Vol. I, p. 738–76.
The facts underlying Smith’s employment with GFHD are also undisputed. Joanie Smith
was a long-term employee of the Glenns Ferry Highway District (“GFHD”) since 2007. Tr. Vol.
I, at 306, p.220–221, L. 21–2; Def. Br. at 2. During the regularly scheduled Commissioner Meeting
on March 11, 2016, Jensen announced her “semi-retirement” effective at the end of the month.1

1

Smith objects to GFHD’s misleading argument that the Commissioners decided in March to
advertise for the open position, or that the position posted in July was “Jensen’s position.” See Def.
br. at 3, ¶ 2. The meeting minutes unambiguously reflect the Commissioner’s decision not to
advertise for any position, and that Jensen and Smith would continue to share job duties of the
Office Manager as Smith continued to train to replace Jensen. See Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 10,
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF- 1

See Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 10, EX. 2 at GFHD 138; Def. Br. at 3. Although Smith had started
in an entry-level position in 2007, Smith’s duties and responsibilities rapidly increased after Jensen
announced her “semi-retirement,” and Smith began training to replace Jensen. Tr. Vol. I, at 309,
p. 32, L. 15–22; Def. Br. at 3. Its undisputed that Jensen stole money from GFHD, and that Smith
engaged in a protected activity under the IPPEA when she reported the theft. Tr. Vol. I, at 315, p.
256–57, L. 17–4; Def. Br. at 3–4. Although Jensen was instructed to repay GFHD, Jensen failed
to do so, and effectively stole more money. R. Vol. I, p. 108, EX. 39A; Def. Br. at 4. It is undisputed
that Jensen was never disciplined, and received a pay raise while continuing to work part-time
alongside Smith, while the two employees shared the duties of Office Manager. R. Vol. I, p. 73,
EX. 22. The Office Manager position is a full-time responsibility, requiring anywhere from thirtytwo to fifty-six hours per week. It is undisputed that the employee that replaced Smith, Lucille
Allen, started working full-time immediately upon being hired. Tr. Vol. I, p. 158, at 496, ll. 23–
24.
It is undisputed that GFHD illegally retaliated against Smith in violation of the IPPEA
when GFHD terminated Smith on August 8, 2016. R. Vol. I, p. 495, Jury Instruction No. 10, ¶ 3;
Def. Br. at 2, fn. 1 (“Liability and the award of the civil penalty are thus not at issue in this appeal.”)
It is particularly significant that both GFHD and the district court acknowledge that the jury was
the proper and dispositive trier of fact on the issue of liability:
Defendant does not dispute that, in light of the jury’s finding that the highway
district violated the IPPEA, Plaintiff may appropriately be awarded some amount
of her lost wages caused by her termination . . . .

EX. 2 at GFHD 138; see also Tr. Vol. I, at 178, p. 575, L. 12–25 (Riggs: “So yes, Linda was going
to train her more and give her more responsibility.”)
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R. Vol. I. p. 568 (emphasis added); see also Def. Br. at 6 (“The district court ruled that it would
try the case with a jury, which would decide the issue of liability . . . .”) (emphasis added). At the
conclusion of the jury trial, held in Elmore County on February 7–9, 2018, the empaneled jury
unambiguously concluded, as a matter of fact, that Smith would have worked full-time (40 hours
per week) beginning January 31, 2017 (prior to commencement of trial), until Smith retired in
approximately January 31, 2021 at the age of sixty-five. R. Vol. I, p. 529; Def. Br. at 6. Consistent
with the jury’s findings of fact, the jury awarded Smith “past income lost” in the amount of
$63,043.92, and “future income lost” of $187,500.00. Id. The only disputed issue on appeal is the
number of hours Smith would have worked, but-for GFHD’s illegal discrimination, and who the
proper trier of fact was. See Def. Br. at 22–26. Smith asks this Court to uphold the jury’s verdict
and order entry of judgment nunc pro tunc to February 9, 2018.
II. ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL
The IPPEA provides that a court may order “payment by the employer of reasonable costs
and attorneys’ fees” to the employee. See I.C. § 6-2106(5). Likewise, “damages” is defined under
Idaho Code section 6-2105 as including “court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” I.C. § 62105(1); see also Wright v. Ada Cty., 160 Idaho 491, 499, 376 P.3d 58, 502 (2016) (permitting an
award of reasonable costs and fees on appeal if Wright prevailed on his Whistleblower Act claim
on remand). Smith seeks an award of attorney’s fees under the IPPEA proportional to all issues
Smith is determined to be the prevailing party on appeal.
Additionally, with regard to GFHD’s cross-appeal on the issue of past lost wages or “back
pay” as GFHD refers to it, as well as GFHD’s argument that it is not bound by its own stipulation
on the record—Smith seeks attorney’s fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. “An award of attorney fees
under Idaho Code § 12–121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only
when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued,
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF- 3

or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.” McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho
551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003). Here, GFHD has defended its breach of its own stipulation and
the district court’s Scheduling Order in an unreasonable and meritless manner. These issues are
dispositive regarding Smith’s appeal. Therefore, but-for GFHD’s unreasonable defense, Smith
would not have incurred the unnecessary costs associated with this appeal. Similarly, there is no
reasonable basis to conclude the district court was not bound by the jury’s award for past lost
wages under the IPPEA statute. Smith respectfully asks for a full award of her attorney’s fees on
appeal at her attorneys’ contractual rate of services.
III. LEGAL RESPONSE
A. GFHD Was Bound by Its Consent and Demand for Jury Trial, and the District Court’s
Order
1. GFHD May Not Breach Its Legally Binding Consent to Trial by Jury
GFHD cannot escape the fact that GFHD entered into a binding stipulation with Smith for
the case to be tried as a jury trial:
2.

Parties estimate that the case will take five (5) days to try.
Case to be tried as: 12 Person Jury Trial.

R. Vol. I, p. 656–57 (Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning). GFHD readily acknowledges that
“stipulations as to facts are generally binding upon the parties. . . .” Def. Br. at 23, citing Firmage
v. Snow, 158 Idaho 343, 348, 347 P.3d 191, 196 (2015). Yet, GFHD nevertheless suggests that
despite being generally bound by its own stipulation, it can still contest Smith’s asserted right to
trial by jury as a “conclusion of law.” Id. GFHD thereby ignores the fact that the parties did not
stipulate to the “right” to have a trial by jury, the parties stipulated to actually doing a trial by jury.
GFHD was bound by its own stipulation to conduct a trial by jury, which even if not proper as a
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matter of right under I.R.C.P. Rule 38, was binding as a matter of consent pursuant to I.R.C.P.
Rule 39(c)(2).
GFHD admits that the only motion it filed challenging the jury trial issue was after the trial
had already concluded. See Def. Br. at 6 (“GFHD submitted the requested Motion on the Verdict
on March 7, 2018.”) GFHD erroneously argues that the fact it mentioned its “equitable relief”
arguments in its trial brief somehow remedies the procedural defectiveness of its untimely motion.
See Def. Br. at 22. However, GFHD’s trial brief was clearly not a proper motion under I.R.C.P.
Rule 7. “A request for a court order must be made by motion.” I.R.C.P. Rule 7(b)(1) (emphasis
added). A motion must “state with particularity the grounds for the relief sought including the
number of the applicable civil rule, if any,” as well as “state the relief sought.” I.R.C.P. Rule
7(b)(1)(B)–(C). GFHD never filed a motion for the court to take any specific action before trial,
and therefore waived its right to challenge the trial procedure. See State v. Hansen, 127 Idaho 675,
678, 904 P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 1995) (“We have previously held that when a challenge to the
jury is not raised in a timely fashion, we will not consider it on appeal, unless, the appellant can
show that the error constituted fundamental error.”)
Similarly, GFHD never requested leave to withdraw its demand for jury trial pursuant to
I.R.C.P. Rule 38(d). GFHD also failed to request to amend its Answer demanding a jury trial. To
the extent that GFHD’s Motion on the Verdict or Trial Brief could be construed as a proper motion
to amend its pleadings under Rule 7, GFHD’s motion was untimely and a violation of the district
court’s Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial. R. Vol. I, p. 660–65. The district court’s
Order Governing Proceedings required a Motion to Amend Pleadings to be filed before June 1,
2017, and dispositive motions to be filed 60 days before trial. Id. at 662–63. Non-dispositive
“Pretrial Motions” had to be filed 28 days before trial. Id. at 663. In contrast, GFHD’s Trial Brief
was not filed until January 30, 2018, seven days prior to trial, and its Motion on the Verdict was
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not filed until a month after the trial was already completed. See Def. Br. at 6; R. Vol. I, p. 364–
79. Contrary to GFHD’s argument, amendment to GFHD’s pleadings is governed by the deadlines
set in I.R.C.P. 16(a)(2)(B), and therefore “must not be modified except by leave of the court on a
showing of good cause or by stipulation of all the parties and approval of the court.” I.R.C.P.
16(a)(3); see also Def. Br. at 32.
GFHD makes no showing of “good cause” why Smith’s claim should not have been tried
by a jury pursuant to the parties’ consent. In fact, on the contrary, justice would require the jury’s
verdict to stand for the reasons stated in section A(5) of Smith’s Opening Brief. App. Br. at 19–
20. The jury is “the single most important guardian of the people's right to be protected from
oppressive and overreaching government.” Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass’n v. Pulley, 125
Idaho 237, 249, 869 P.2d 554, 566 (1993). The decision to uphold Smith’s jury verdict is consistent
with I.R.C.P. Rule 1 that provides, “[t]hese rules should be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Id. (emphasis
added). GFHD should not be rewarded for what this Court has previously described as a
“retromingent attitude,” in attempting to repudiate its binding stipulation on the record. See Annest
v. Conrad-Annest, Inc., 107 Idaho 468, 470, 690 P.2d 923, 925 (1984) (per curiam).
2. GFHD Is Bound by Its Demand for Trial by Jury Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rules 38, 39
GFHD also cannot avoid the legal consequences of its own demand for jury trial pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 38 and 39. GFHD specifically demanded a trial by jury on all issues, including damages:
Defendant, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby
demands a trial by jury of the Plaintiff’s action for damages.
R. Vol. I, p. 654 (Defendant’s Answer To Plaintiff’s Complaint and Demand For Jury Trial)
(emphasis added); see also I.R.C.P. Rule 38(c) (“In its demand, a party may specify the issues that
it wishes to have tried by a jury; otherwise, it is considered to have demanded a jury trial on all the
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issues so triable.”) Smith specifically objects to GFHD’s inaccurate statement that it only
consented to trial by jury on the issue of liability:
The case went to trial in February 2018. The parties consented to a jury trial on the
issue of liability.
Def. Br. at 1. GFHD’s statement is a deliberate mischaracterization of the record and the facts
before this Court. Defendant’s Answer and the parties’ Stipulation proves that the parties consented
to a jury trial on all issues, including damages. See R. Vol. I, p. 654, 656–57. Such a demand and
consent are expressly governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Idaho’s Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate that once a party demands trial by jury, a
demand may only be withdrawn by all parties’ consent:
(d) Waiver; Withdrawal. A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly
served and filed. A proper demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent.
I.R.C.P. Rule 38(d) (emphasis added). GFHD was therefore legally precluded from breaching its
own demand for trial by jury without Smith’s consent. Federal courts have addressed this specific
issue in the context of the identical language in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39:
Accordingly, we conclude that whatever right a party may have to withdraw a jury
demand unilaterally under Reid Brothers,[2] that right is extinguished at the onset
of trial. Once trial begins, a party may no longer unilaterally withdraw its jury
demand; other parties are entitled to rely whether they have waived their rights or
not, and withdrawal may occur only in compliance with the language of Rule 39(a).

2

Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 1304 (9th Cir. 1983) involves a
jury demand withdrawal in which only one party demanded trial by jury. See id. The Reid Bros.
court provided a limited exception to the normal rule that all parties must consent to withdraw a
demand for jury trial. That exception only applies when 1) a party did not demand a jury trial at
the outset, 2) the party actively opposed jury trial demanded by the opposing party, and 3) the party
that failed to demand a jury trial then sought to preclude the opposing party from withdrawing the
demand after trial. Id.
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Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1532 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 24, 1995)
(emphasis added); see also Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 796, 41 P.3d 220, 224
(2001) (“[P]reference for interpreting the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in conformance with the
interpretation placed upon the same language in the federal rules.”) The Fuller Court affirmed the
rationale underlying Rule 38(d) as applied to both jury withdrawal and jury waiver cases, namely
that a party should not have “two bites at the procedural apple” if a trial does not end in a party’s
favor:
Of relevance is one of the primary rationales behind White v. McGinnis, the leading
jury waiver case in the circuit. White reaffirms a simple principle: a party ought not
to have two bites at the procedural apple. In White, the plaintiff demanded a jury,
then stood silently by as the court proceeded to try his claim from the bench. Only
after the court had ruled against him did he object. White, 903 F.2d at 700. We
concluded that that was too late, for “[t]he appellant chose to argue his case fully
before the district judge; it is not unjust to hold him to that commitment.” Id. at
703; accord Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 228 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Another policy
justifying the jury demand waiver rule is the view that it is unfair to permit a party
to have a trial, discover that it has lost, and then raise the jury issue because it is
unsatisfied with the result at trial.”)
Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1531 (emphasis added), citing White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 903, 903, 111 S. Ct. 266 (1990). In fact, GFHD expressly admitted in
its trial brief that it did not object to a jury trial, specifically so it could take a “second bite at the
apple”:
Therefore, for purposes of judicial economy, in the event the jury finds liability,
GFHD does not object to the Court utilizing the jury in an advisory capacity for
purposes of any order under I.C. § 6-2106. (citation omitted). In this way the jury
will reach its verdict as to liability and damages as in a typical case. If liability is
not found, this issue will be moot. If liability is found, the parties can address this
issue further with the Court at that time, if necessary.
R. Vol. I, p. 378 (emphasis added); see also Def. Br. at 22. Smith had a right to rely on the parties’
mutual demands and consent to trial by jury, and to create a trial strategy in reliance upon the
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parties’ consent. To allow GFHD a “second bite at the apple” is not in accord with fundamental
principles of fairness and justice, Due Process, or judicial economy:
Those who believe in strict construction of our Constitution recognize that the
judiciary's oath to “support and defend the Constitution” requires that we resist the
temptation to enhance judicial power through encroachment into the provinces
constitutionally delegated to the jury.
David Steed & Assocs., Inc. v. Young, 115 Idaho 247, 249, 766 P.2d 717, 719 (1988).
3. The District Court’s Decision to Grant GFHD’s Post-Jury Verdict Motion for a Court
Trial Was Unjust, Caused Extreme Delay, and Excessive Expense in Violation of
I.R.C.P. Rule 1
GFHD argues that the district court was not bound by its own scheduling order. In so doing,
GFHD completely ignores this Court’s recent holding that “[w]hile counsel truly cannot bind a
court by counsel’s stipulation as to procedure, it is entirely up to the court whether or not to accept
the stipulation . . . Stipulations of counsel do not bind the court, but scheduling orders do.” KDN
Mgmt., Inc. v. WinCo Foods, LLC, 164 Idaho 1, 423 P.3d 422, 428 (2018) (emphasis added). By
failing to even address this Court’s decision in KDN Mgmt., Inc., GFHD waives any objection to
its application in this case.
The jury trial concluded February 9, 2018. See R. Vol. I. p., 532. Due to GFHD’s post-trial
motions and the district court’s willingness to hear them, a judgment was not entered until May
25, 2018. R. Vol. I, p. 774. After receiving the district court’s decision, Smith filed post-trial
motions within fourteen days to reconsider the legal conclusion made and to submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are customary in court trials. The district court did
not hear the motion until August 14, 2018 and did not issue a decision until February 25, 2019,
more than one year after the jury verdict. See Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 98. The one-year delay in issuing
a final decision and excessive expense incurred post-jury verdict demonstrates why granting the
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“Motion on the Verdict” was an abuse of discretion and legally improper. The rules of procedure
were intended to provide for the orderly resolution of disputes:
[T]he adoption of I.R.C.P. 38(b) was a proper exercise of the inherent rule making
power of this court, and merely establishes the orderly procedure to be employed
in determining whether a party has waived the right to trial by jury.
City of Pocatello v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370, 373, 679 P.2d 647, 650 (1984). Ordinarily, trial
courts do not look favorably on belated attempts to change how trials are decided.
Smith does not dispute that the district court is afforded substantial authority to “amend
and control its process and orders.” See I.C. § 1-1603(8). However, it is still bound to do so in the
interests of “law and justice.” Id. Changing the rules governing trial after the trial is completed is
not consistent with either law or justice. Furthermore, whereas Rule 39 does contemplate some
discretion on the part of the district court to order a jury by consent or not, Rule 39—read in its
entirety—undeniably demonstrates a preference for relying on the consent of the parties as to the
procedure utilized at trial. See I.R.C.P. Rule 39(a)(1), (c)(2) (i.e. parties may consent to conduct
the trial in any procedural manner, regardless of the parties’ substantive rights.) This Court has
held, “it is to be pointed out that the requirement that the rules of civil procedure be liberally
construed to secure just determination of any particular case is equally applicable to the provisions
of I.R.C.P. 39.” R. E. W. Const. Co. v. Dist. Court of Third Judicial Dist., 88 Idaho 426, 443, 400
P.2d 390, 401 (1965).
Relitigating Smith’s claims after the jury trial directly contravened I.R.C.P. Rule 1, and
thereby denied Smith a just and speedy determination of her claim. Most importantly of all, when
one considers the fundamental role the jury plays in our society and our judicial system, the
assumption should always be in favor of a jury instead of a bench trial. “If, in the rare case, a tie
breaker is needed, let us break the tie in favor of jury trial.” Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers,
Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 580, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1353 (1990) (J. Brennan, concurring).
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The district court’s orders should be vacated, and judgment should be entered on the Jury’s Special
Verdict.
B. Smith Has A Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury Under the IPPEA
1. The Scope of Idaho Constitution Art. I, Section 7 Is Governed by the Framers’ Intent
to Protect Citizens’ Inviolable Right to Trial by Jury in Perpetuity
Idaho’s Constitution is unambiguous regarding the substantive right of citizens to submit
their civil causes of action to be tried by a jury:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but in civil actions, three-fourths of
the jury may render a verdict, and the legislature may provide that in all cases of
misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict. A trial by jury may be
waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court,
and in civil actions by the consent of the parties, signified in such manner as may
be prescribed by law.
Idaho Const. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added). The term “inviolate” is among the strongest terms used
in Idaho’s Constitution, meaning “free from violation, not broken, infringed, or impaired.” Black’s
Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) at 904, “inviolate.” In interpreting Idaho’s Constitution, this Court
recognizes, “Article 1, § 7 preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at the common law and
under the territorial statutes when the Idaho Constitution was adopted.” Kirkland v. Blaine Cty.
Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 464, 467, 4 P.3d 1115, 1118 (2000) (emphasis added), citing State v. Bennion,
112 Idaho 32, 730 P.2d 952 (1986). However, this Court also recognizes that the right to trial by
jury, as it existed prior to 1890, is only the beginning of the analysis:
Though we are not bound by historic stereotype, we will endeavor to interpret
Article 1, § 7 consistent with the right to jury trial as the Framers conceived it. D.C.
v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627, 57 S. Ct. 660, 663 (1937) (“We are aware that those
standards of action and of policy which find expression in the common and statute
law may vary from generation to generation. Such change has led to the
abandonment of the lash and the stocks, and we may assume, for present purposes,
that commonly accepted views of the severity of punishment by imprisonment may
become so modified that a penalty once thought to be mild may come to be regarded
as so harsh as to call for the jury trial, which the Constitution prescribes, in some
cases which were triable without a jury when the Constitution was adopted.”);
Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 396 (Alaska 1970) (“We feel that the
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argument from history is not determinative because what was practical historically
is not necessarily adequate to the needs of our times. To look only to history would
deny a progressive development of our legal institutions.”).
State v. Bennion, 112 Idaho 32, 38, 730 P.2d 952, 958 (1986) (emphasis added). Therefore, there
is an important distinction between applying Article 1, section 7 consistent with the intention of
the Framers, rather than being slavishly bound by the law as it existed in 1890.
Smith’s claim for monetary damages is exactly the type of claim required to be submitted
to a trial by jury under Idaho’s territorial statutes, and therefore under the Constitution of the State
of Idaho. See Idaho Const. art. I, § 7. Idaho’s territorial laws and the first laws of the State of Idaho
recognized an expansive substantive right to trial by jury when the relief sought was for money
damages arising from actual injury or harm, as opposed to other remedies arising in equity:
Sec. 4369. In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or
without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract, or as damages for
breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact must be tried by a jury, unless a
jury trial is waived, or a reference is ordered, as provided in this Code. Where, in
these cases, there are issues both of law and fact, the issue of law must be first
disposed of. In other cases, issues of fact must be tried by the court subject to its
power to order an issue to be referred to a referee, as provided in this Code.
...
Sec. 4398. When a verdict is found for the plaintiff in an action for the recovery of
money, or for the defendant, when a counter claim for the recovery of money is
established, exceeding the amount of the plaintiff’s claim as established, the jury
must also find the amount of the recovery.
Rev. Stat. of Idaho, §§ 4369, 4398 (1887) (emphasis added). Therefore, early territorial statutes
looked only to the types of relief sought to determine whether a jury or a court should hear a claim.
Idaho’s territorial statutes were consistent with the existing common law at the time, which reflects
that a lawsuit seeking monetary judgment is always considered an “action at law” entitled to a trial
by jury:
It would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to state any general rule which would
determine in all cases what should be deemed a suit in equity as distinguished from
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an action at law, for particular elements may enter into consideration which would
take the matter from one court to the other; but this may be said, that where an
action is simply for the recovery and possession of specific, real, or personal
property, or for the recovery of a money judgment, the action is one at law. An
action for the recovery of real property, including damages for withholding it, has
always been of that class. The right which in this case the plaintiff wishes to assert
is his title to certain real property; the remedy which he wishes to obtain is its
possession and enjoyment; and in a contest over the title both parties have a
constitutional right to call for a jury.
Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151, 11 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1891) (emphasis added); see also
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) at 1407, “adequate remedy at law” (“a legal remedy (such
as an award of damages) that provides sufficient relief to the petitioning party, thus preventing the
party from obtaining equitable relief.”) Indeed, among the earliest decisions of this Court, prior
even to statehood, it was recognized that the only material distinction that need be set forth
(regardless of whether an action arose under law or equity) was the type of relief requested:
Our answer, therefore, is that the two jurisdictions may be blended in the same
complaint, subject only to the condition that the different grounds of relief shall be
distinctly and separately stated.
Wa Ching v. Constantine, 1 Idaho 266, 268 (1869) (Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho).
Thereafter, the Framers of Idaho’s Constitution prohibited any distinction between suits in equity
and actions at law, and expressly provided any factual issues must be tried before a jury:
The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such
actions and suits, are hereby prohibited; and there shall be in this state but one form
of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the redress of private
wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action; and every action prosecuted by
the people of the state as a party, against a person charged with a public offense,
for the punishment of the same, shall be termed a criminal action.
Feigned issues are prohibited, and the fact at issue shall be tried by order of
court before a jury.
Idaho Const. art. V, § 1 (bold and emphasis added). Smith therefore objects to GFHD’s attempt to
essentially write Art. I, section 7 and Art. V, section 1 out of Idaho’s Constitution.
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2. Smith’s Future Lost Wages is an Issue of Fact Regarding “Actual Damages”
Smith’s claim for damages arising from her actual lost compensation under the IPPEA is a
statutory codification of common law claims and actual damages that are reserved for the jury to
resolve.
The stated purpose of the IPPEA is to “protect the integrity of government by providing a
legal cause of action for public employees . . . .”) I.C. § 6-2101 (emphasis added). A plaintiff under
the IPPEA “may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both. .
. .” I.C. § 6–2105 (emphasis added). Smith notes that the term “legal cause of action” directly
contradicts GFHD’s argument that the IPPEA is effectively a suit in equity. See Def. Br. at 19–20.
Additionally, Idaho’s invocation of the term “civil action” refers directly to Idaho Const. Art. 1, §
7 and Art. V, § 1, which provide that issues of fact must be tried by a jury trial. Id. Therefore, the
IPPEA expressly provides for a trial by jury.
Consistent with the plain language of the IPPEA, this Court recognizes that the IPPEA is
analogous to common law claims for breach of contract and wrongful discharge:
[W]hen the Legislature enacted the Whistleblower Act, the resulting statutory cause
of action displaced the common law cause of action for breach of an at-will
employment contract premised on the protected activities outlined in the Act.
Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 561, 212 P.3d 982, 991 (2009); see also Eller v. Idaho
State Police, Dkt. Nos. 45698, 45699 (Idaho, May 24, 2019) (Slip Opinion at 7). Contrary to
GFHD’s arguments that a claim for lost wages would be precluded against a political subdivision
at the time the Constitution was passed, see Def. Br. at 17, the Idaho Supreme Court expressly
affirmed a plaintiff’s substantive right to a trial by jury for the recovery of money judgment for
lost wages against a Board of County Commissioners, contemporaneously with the adoption of
Idaho’s Constitution:
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Section 4369, Rev. St. 1887, provides that in certain cases issues of fact must be
tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived. The case at bar comes within the
provisions of said section, and the court did not err in submitting the case to a jury.
Section 4396 provides that in a certain class of cases the jury may, in their
discretion, render a general or special verdict. The case under consideration comes
within that class.
Fisher v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bannock Cty., 4 Idaho 381, 39 P. 552, 552 (1895); see also Neal v.
Drainage Dist. No. 2 of Ada Cty., 42 Idaho 624, 248 P. 22, 24 (1926):
The agreement herein cannot be construed as a waiver of a jury trial as
contemplated by statute, in this a new and independent action brought to recover
money or damages either upon the contract or for the breach of it. The court erred
in denying the appellant a jury trial, and for this reason the cause must be reversed
Id. Indeed, the jury has long been recognized as the “exclusive judges” on the issue of
compensatory damages:
[W]e are at a loss to know how we are to infer that because the jury found a
particular sum under a correct charge as to the law, and the facts of which they were
the exclusive judges, therefore they gave more than compensatory damages. The
jury have not told us that they intended exemplary damages, and to presume it
would be to presume against the long-established rule that a jury are presumed to
find according to the law and facts.
Cox v. Nw. Stage Co., 1 Idaho 376, 385 (1871) (Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho) (emphasis
added); Johansen v. Looney, 30 Idaho 123, 163 P. 303, 305 (1917) (“We are very clearly of the
opinion that the case before us was in its nature one for money had and received, that the plaintiff
was entitled to a jury trial, and that the court erred in referring the case.”); see also Kirkland, 134
Idaho at 467 (“Therefore, it is clear as early as 1871 the Territory of Idaho recognized the right of
the jury to assess and award general or noneconomic damages to plaintiffs in personal injury
cases.”) Smith’s claim under the IPPEA falls within the class of issues triable by jury as a matter
of right under Idaho’s Constitution and traditional common law.
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3. Equitable Remedies Available Under the IPPEA Do Not Limit Smith’s Award for
Actual Damages
GFHD continues to rely on the fictional distinction between “front pay” and “back pay”
under the IPPEA, despite the fact that the statute only refers to “lost wages.” See I.C. § 6-2106(4).
However, this Court recently affirmed in Eller that “lost wages” refers broadly to the compensatory
award for “actual damages,” and refers to past and future lost damages “without differentiation.”
Eller, Dkt. Nos. 45698, 45699 (Idaho, May 24, 2019) (Slip Opinion at 10). The jury’s award for
Smith’s past and future lost wages were “actual damages” for which the jury was the proper and
exclusive trier of fact.
Interpreting the IPPEA under basic principles of statutory construction, this Court
unequivocally held that the equitable remedies (such as injunctive relief and reinstatement) are
merely additional remedies available under the Court’s discretion, but which do not limit a jury’s
award for compensatory “actual damages”:
Given this conclusion, we clarify that Idaho Code section 6-2106 does not take
away Eller’s non-economic damages remedy as provided in section 6-2105. Section
6-2106 is an independent and expanded list of remedies a court may order when
violations of the Act are found to exist, but it is not a restriction on a claimant’s
ability to seek and receive redress for non-economic damages as part of “actual
damages.”
The list under Idaho Code section 6-2106 includes injunctive relief and specific
performance, economic damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, and civil fines. I.C. § 62106. This list expands the relief which a claimant may receive to include mainly
equitable remedies that a court may order independently of a jury.
Id. at 10–11 (emphasis added); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004) (“Actual damages”
is defined broadly as an “amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven injury or
loss,” and is synonymous with compensatory damages, tangible damages, and real damages).
Implicit in this Court’s Eller decision was the fact that the issue of actual damages was properly
tried before a jury. Id.
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GFHD also ignores this Court’s precedent and the plain language of the IPPEA by arguing
federal law under Title VII applies to this Court’s interpretation of the IPPEA. In articulating its
argument, GFHD ignores key statutory differences between the remedies available under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act and the remedies under the IPPEA. See Def. Br. at 19 (“front pay is likewise
an equitable remedy.”) GFHD cites to Traxler v. Multnomah County, 596 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.
2010), Pollard v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co, 532 U.S. 843, 853 n.3, 121 S. Ct. 1946, 1952
(2001), and other federal cases. See id. However, GFHD entirely ignores the fact that under Title
VII’s unique definition of “compensatory damages,” back pay and other economic damages are
not ordinarily available:
(2) Exclusions from compensatory damages. Compensatory damages awarded
under this section shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type
of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2), (c). Instead, the United States Congress deliberately chose to make
reinstatement the “preferred” remedy under those statutes, rather than money damages. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see also Gotthardt v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1156
(9th Cir. 1999). Equitable relief became the preferred remedy under federal civil rights statutes for
the practical reason that court-administered equitable relief was the only remedy to combat the fact
victims of public discrimination were regularly subjected to continued discrimination in the
courtroom from biased juries. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 446–47, 88 S. Ct.
2186, 2207 (1968) 3 (J. Douglas concurring); see also Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth

3

“In nearly every department of American life they are confronted by this insidious influence. It
fills the air. It meets them at the workshop and factory, when they apply for work. It meets them
at the church, at the hotel, at the ballot-box, and worst of all, it meets them in the jury-box. Without
crime or offense against law or gospel, the colored man is the Jean Valjean of American society.
He has escaped from the galleys, and hence all presumptions are against him. The workshop denies
him work, and the inn denies him shelter; the ballot-box a fair vote, and the jury-box a fair trial.”
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Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019, 1051, n. 229
(1969). However, unlike the federal statutes cited by GFHD, Idaho’s Whistleblower Act has
neither an express nor an implied preference for equitable remedies. Rather, Idaho law distinctly
prefers legal remedies, and only provides “extraordinary” equitable remedies “where there is not
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Westover v. Cundick, 161
Idaho 933, 936, 393 P.3d 593, 596 (2017) (citing I.C. §§ 7-303, 7-402). Here, Smith merely seeks
entry of judgment on the jury’s award for her compensatory “actual damages.”
C. The Jury’s Verdict Was Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence and
GFHD’s Cross-Appeal Should Be Denied
GFHD asks this Court to second-guess the jury’s factual findings that Smith would have
worked full-time for GFHD, but-for her illegal termination. See Def. Br. at 25 (“the jury’s award
of front and back pay were ‘based on a set of circumstances that has no basis in the evidence
introduced at trial.’”) GFHD makes four arguments that Smith would not have worked full-time
at GFHD, all of which were argued to the jury and rejected because they are clearly contrary to
the evidence and testimony at trial:
1) GFHD would not have hired Smith full-time because in February 2016, Jensen
reported to the Commissioners that Smith was not capable of taking over
Jensen’s position;
2) The Commissioners granted Smith a pay raise in July 2018, at the same time
they posted the advertisement for her position;
3) Although Smith submitted an application for the posted position, she also
considered resigning;
4) The GFHD Personnel Manual only provides current employees “may” be given
preference, it does not require existing employees to be hired.
See generally Def. Br. at 25–26.
As discussed below, each argument is contradicted by the clear weight of the evidence and
testimony introduced at trial. See also Appellant’s Opening Br. at 20–31. Furthermore, even if
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GFHD’s arguments are accepted as true, they do not merit overturning the jury’s verdict. “The
evidence supporting the jury’s verdict may be contradicted, but the verdict will be upheld if it is
‘of such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the
verdict of the jury was proper.’” Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 151 Idaho 388, 391, 257
P.3d 755, 758 (2011) (internal citation omitted).
1. GFHD Provided Smith with Additional Training to Prepare Smith to Replace Jensen
GFHD’s entire legal defense was essentially based on testimony that Jensen allegedly told
the Commissioners in February 2016 that Smith was not ready to take over as Office Manager yet.
Tr. Vol. I. at p. 135, at 405 ll. 5–20 (Direct Examination of Jim Gluch). Jensen’s comment was not
contested by Smith, and Smith addressed the rumors she had heard about Jensen’s comment during
her own direct examination. See generally Tr. Vol. I, p. 48, at 54–55. However, Smith entirely
disputes that the evidence is relevant to her ability to replace Jensen at the time she was fired in
August 2016, or her ability to replace Jensen in January 2017, when the jury found she would have
begun working full-time. See R. Vol. I, p. 529.
First, Smith readily admits that in February 2016, there were aspects of the Office Manager
position that she had not been exposed to yet. Smith had only just begun taking minutes at the
Commissioner Meetings in February 2016, and it was only after Jensen announced her “semiretirement” that Smith began to learn other aspects of the Office Manager position, like how to do
the budget and payroll. Tr. Vol. I, p. 139 at 418, ll. 11–17. Both Superintendent Jim Gluch and
Smith’s replacement, Lucille Allen, testified that there was an objective learning curve to taking
over as full-time Office Manager, and Ms. Allen testified that there were still aspects of the job
she was learning at the time of trial. Tr. Vol. I, p. 136 at 408, ll. 1–4 (Gluch) (“Joanie had certain
duties as billing, payroll, et cetera. Linda, she did the budget and other items which she was more
educated in that than Joanie was.”); see also Tr. Vol. I, p. 159, at 500, ll. 18–23 (Allen) (“I am not
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sure I am still up to speed.”) Jensen’s subjective opinion about Smith’s ability to do the job in
February 2016 was not persuasive or relevant to the jury’s finding that Smith would have begun
working full-time in January 2017.
Second, Jensen had personal incentives to convince the Board of Commissioners Smith
was not “ready” to replace her in February 2016. At that time, Jensen was in the process of
negotiating a new contract with GFHD, which ultimately paid her the same amount of money she
was making prior to her “semi-retirement,” while only requiring Jensen to work half as many hours
(effective rate of $48.00 per hour). R. Vol. I, p. 73, Ex. 22. Jensen’s self-serving comment was
only intended to provide herself with job security, and was not indicative of Smith’s actual
performance in the position. The evidence, taken as a whole at trial, demonstrates that Jensen was
a master-manipulator, and likely made the comment to make Smith do all of the Office Manager
duties, and thus make Jensen’s job easier:
Q. (By Mr. Hepworth): If somebody told you that you weren’t up to the job, how
would you respond?
A. (Chairman Crane): I would probably try to prove them wrong.
Q. Me too. Me too. And there has been testimony that after Linda told Joanie that,
that Joanie took on a whole lot of responsibilities. Can you accept that?
A. I guess I can, yes.
Q. And that would be consistent with what you would expect, it would motivate
her to work harder, wouldn’t it?
A. I would assume it would.
Q. Okay. And the harder Joanie works, the less Linda has to do, isn’t it?
A. Yeah, I guess so.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 186, at 608–609, ll. 22–14. Superintendent Gluch also contradicted Jensen’s alleged
comment about Smith’s performance, and testified that he believed Smith would eventually
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replace Jensen, and was qualified to do so:
Q: (by Mr. Naylor) So at that point in time – prior to that point in time, was it your
belief that Ms. Smith was eventually going to replace Ms. Jensen when she retired?
A. (Mr. Gluch): Yes, prior to that time, yes.
Q. You had no reason not to believe that that might work?
A. That’s correct, I had no reason to believe any different.
Q. And it made sense because anybody who has been doing any part of the job is
better than somebody who has no knowledge about the job?
A. That is correct.
Tr. Vol. I. p. 135–136, at 405–406, ll. 21–8. In March 2016, the Board of Commissioners decided
not to advertise for an open position, because Smith was capable of sharing the job duties and
learning on the job. Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 10, EX. 2 at GFHD 138. Commissioner Riggs
admitted that the Board of Commissioners intended for Smith to train under Jensen and get more
experience and take over more responsibility in preparation for replacing Jensen:
Q. And that over time —Well, what was the purpose in your mind for her to be
trained in Linda’s Job?
A. She needed to learn more about Linda’s job. She hadn’t done everything
involved in the job. So yes, Linda was going to train her more and give her
more responsibility. That was my understanding.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 178, at 575, ll. 18–25.
Jim Gluch testified that at the time of Smith’s termination, Smith was completing
approximately seventy-percent of the Office Manager duties, and was doing a good job overall.
See Tr. Vol. I, p. 104–105, at 279–280, ll. 13–6; p. 109, at 299–300, ll. 22–1. Even Commissioner
Riggs testified that at the time Smith applied for the posted position in July 2017, he considered
her the “front runner” for the position. Tr. Vol. I, p. 170, at 544, ll. 2–13. The district court affirmed
that Smith was “capable” of learning how to complete all the Office Manager duties. Supp. R. Vol.
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I, at 73 (Memorandum Decision and Order ¶ 5). The only thing that prevented Smith from taking
the full-time position working forty hours per week, like her successor Lucille Allen, was GFHD’s
illegal retaliation.
2. Smith’s Raise to $18.00 Per Hour Supports Her Claim She Would Have Been Hired
Full-Time
GFHD refers to the fact that the Board of Commissioners granted Smith a raise prior to the
decision to terminate in support of GFHD’s argument that Smith would not have worked fulltime—although Smith does not understand how GFHD contends that supports its position. See
generally Def. Br. at 25. In fact, Smith contends this point proves the fact she would have worked
full-time, but-for GFHD’s illegal retaliation. Smith’s pay-raise is direct evidence that Smith was
doing an excellent job as co-Office Manager, and was therefore ready to take over full-time to
replace Jensen in July 2016. This inference is supported by the fact Superintendent Jim Gluch
specifically testified he supported Smith earning a raise, and advocated on her behalf:
Q. (By Mr. Hepworth): I just want to know did you advocate for Joanie?
A. Yes. I did say that I felt she deserved a raise.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 107, at 290, ll. 4–7.
If Smith was doing a good enough job to have earned a raise while completing nearly
seventy-percent of the Office Manager’s duties—Smith was clearly qualified to replace Jensen.
The fact that GFHD terminated Smith only a month later at the request of Jensen is direct evidence
of its retaliation and illegal motivations.
3. The Fact That Smith Considered Resigning Is Evidence of the Hostility in the Work
Environment Caused by GFHD’s Illegal Retaliation
GFHD’s only other pretextual defense for terminating Smith was that Smith had considered
resigning from GFHD due to the retaliation she was experiencing in the workplace. As GFHD
admits, “While Smith requested that Gluch remove the resignation letter from her file, Gluch
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notified the Commissioners of the letter.” Def. Br. at 26. Although GFHD attempted to “spin” this
narrative and accuse Smith of being a “disgruntled employee,” Smith’s draft resignation letter is
clear that her displeasure was directly caused by Jensen’s workplace retaliation and harassment:
Dear Jim Gluch,
Please accept this letter as my formal resignation from my position as Office
Assistant with Glenns Ferry Highway District. I have expressed many times how
the working conditions have changed and have escalated to a point of much
discomfort bringing me to the point where I must resign. I feel that it is not only
unprofessional but just plain wrong that after 7 years of continuous employment
here that my position has been posted! I have never had to be disciplined, counseled
or received any written or oral reprimands, nor have I been given an explanation as
to why others are being considered for my very position. My last day of work will
be August 31, 2016. While I do regret any inconvenience my resignation will cause
for Jimmy, as he has been an exemplary manager, I cannot continue under these
circumstances. I will do all I can to ensure that my leaving is as smooth a transition
as possible.
Over the next few weeks, I will work to ensure that all of my paperwork and duties
are made to be current, however, if I receive calls to home or any other harassment
as I have received over the last few months, I will tender my resignation
immediately.
Ex. on Appeal, Vol. I, p. 69, Ex. 12 GFHD 396 (emphasis added).
Although GFHD attempts to argue that Smith’s contemplation of resignation provided a
reasonable basis to terminate Smith, it is really evidence to the contrary: Smith’s letter should be
understood as a formal complaint regarding the working conditions at GFHD, which GFHD not
only ignored—but retaliated against her for expressing. See Hatheway v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Idaho, 155 Idaho 255, 269 310 P.3d 315, 329 (2013) (action materially adverse if “well might
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”)
Smith’s consideration of resigning is a symptom of the retaliation Smith faced at GFHD, and yet
another example of GFHD failing to prevent adverse actions under the IPPEA. If GFHD
terminated Joanie for complaining about the working conditions at GFHD, that is de jure
retaliation—consistent with GFHD’s admission of liability in this case under the IPPEA.
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4. GFHD’s Personnel Manual Supports the Jury’s Verdict
Lastly, GFHD relies on the argument that despite GFHD having a codified “Preference For
Hiring From Within,” that this Court should ignore the policy because the manual provides existing
employees “may” be given preference over outside applicants, rather than requiring existing
employees to be given preference. See Def. Br. at 26; see also Confidential R. Vol. I, p. 33, GFHD
175. In reality, GFHD’s argument is a perfect example of why the district court erred by
overturning the jury’s verdict.
There is no dispute that GFHD had a preference for hiring from within. However, GFHD
appears to argue that the policy should not be given very much consideration. Def. Br. at 26.
GFHD’s argument is improper on appeal. “While we must review the evidence, we are not in a
position to ‘weigh’ it as the trial court can.” Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 568, 97 P.3d 428,
435 (2004). Although Smith has never argued that the personnel manual alone is dispositive of
Smith’s future damages, it is certainly uncontroverted evidence that should have been considered
by the jury, and which supports the jury’s verdict for purposes of appeal.
On the contrary, this Court recognizes that circumstantial evidence may be properly
considered in support of an at-will employee’s claim for future damages. “In the context of an
employment contract for an indefinite term, a plaintiff might resort to evidence such as
employment history to show likelihood of future employment. Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274,
280, 923 P.2d 981, 987 (1996). “[E]vidence is sufficient if it proves the damages with reasonable
certainty. ‘Reasonable certainty’ requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude.
. . .” Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co,, Inc., 146 Idaho 613, 618, 200 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2009). In
this case, GFHD has provided zero evidence why GFHD would have hired an outside applicant
over Smith. There is no evidence to support the inference that Lucille Allen would have been hired
over Smith. In fact, all testimony at trial was that Smith was expected to replace Jensen, up until
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the point that Jensen called the special meeting and demanded that Smith get terminated.
Therefore, there is substantial and credible evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and there is
insufficient evidence to overturn the jury’s verdict (whether on appeal, or under a I.R.C.P. 59
JNOV standard). GFHD’s cross-appeal should be denied, and Smith respectfully asks that this
Court reverse the district court’s post-verdict Orders and enter judgment on the jury’s verdict nunc
pro tunc.
D. The IPPEA and Idaho Code Section 28-22-104 Preclude Application of Sovereign
Immunity Regarding Smith’s Claim for Post-Judgment Interest
GFHD maintains that sovereign immunity precludes an assessment of post-judgment
interest under Idaho Constitution Art. VII, § 13, which provides “No money shall be drawn from
the treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law.” Def. Br. at 35. However, GFHD
entirely ignores the obvious fact that the Idaho Legislature expressly consented to judgment being
entered against the State under the IPPEA. I.C. § 6-2106 (“A court, in rendering a judgment
brought under this chapter, may order any or all of the following. . . .”) Analogously, I.C. § 28-22104 expressly provides that post-judgment interest applies to “all” judgments:
The legal rate of interest as announced by the treasurer on July 1 of each year shall
operate as the rate applying for the succeeding twelve (12) months to all judgments
declared during such succeeding twelve (12) month period.
I.C. § 28-22-104(2) (emphasis added). “All judgments” clearly and unambiguously applies to
judgment against the State of Idaho, and any of its political subdivisions, where the State of Idaho
has already waived its right to sovereign immunity.
GFHD’s reliance on abrogated and inapplicable case law is similarly misplaced. The origin
of GFHD’s argument begins with American Oil Co. v. Neill, 90 Idaho 333, 414 P.2d 206 (1966).
American Oil Co. involved a dispute over costs and fees for the wrongful collection of taxes. Id.
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at 335, 414 P.2d at 207. This Court declined to grant the prevailing party interest on judgment,
finding that the litigant failed to cite a statute that applied:
Although certain statutes of this state authorize payment of interest on tax refunds:
(i. e., I.C. § 49-1238(e) on refunds under special fuel tax; I.C. § 63-3073 on income
tax refunds; I.C. § 63-2202, refunds of sums collected by counties for taxes), no
statute has been called to the attention of this court authorizing payment of interest
on the funds involved herein; plaintiff in its brief recognized the absence of
statutory authority in this regard, when it stated therein: ‘In its present form the Act
does not contain a provision for payment of interest on taxes illegally or erroneously
collected.’
It is our conclusion that plaintiff is not entitled to interest on the sums paid and to
which it is entitled to judgment, without interest.
American Oil Co., 90 Idaho at 339, 414 P.2d at 209–10. Importantly, the plaintiffs in American
Oil Co. did not rely upon I.C. § 28-22-104 in their request for interest on judgment, and therefore
the court’s holding does not apply to Smith’s request for interest on judgment in this case. Id.
Furthermore, American Oil Co. was expressly overruled by Ada Cty. v. Red Steer Drive-Ins of
Nevada, Inc., 101 Idaho 94, 609 P.2d 161 (1980), which also involved the recovery of
discriminatory tax assessments. Id. The plaintiffs in Red Steer did cite Idaho Code Section 28-22104. This Court recognized that Idaho’s general statute for interest on judgment was sufficiently
clear and equally applicable to all judgments, and expressly overruled American Oil Co. Id. at 100,
609 P.2d at 167 (“To the extent that this decision affects a change from our previous position on
the issue of interest payments, American Oil Company v. Neill, supra, is hereby overruled.”) The
Red Steer court’s underlying basis for its award of interest on judgment was the same reason Smith
is entitled to interest on judgment in this matter:
Furthermore, the payment of interest on the amount due is necessary to fully
compensate Red Steer since the loss of the use of the money from the time of its
overassessment until its recovery represents additional costs to it. We therefore
reverse the judgment of the district court only as it pertains to the denial of interest
and remand this portion to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in
favor of Red Steer, entitling it to interest on the judgment.
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Ada Cty. v. Red Steer Drive-Ins of Nevada, Inc., 101 Idaho 94, 100, 609 P.2d 161, 167 (1980)
(emphasis added). The Red Steer Court recognized that loss of use of the plaintiff’s money is
essentially a “cost” of litigation. Notably, I.C. § 6-2105(1) defines “damages” as including “court
costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Id. Additionally, I.C. § 6-2106(5) allows for “the payment
by the employer of reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.” Id. Where loss of use of her wages and
benefits is clearly a damage Smith suffered because of GFHD’s illegal retaliation, interest on
judgment is a cost properly awarded under the IPPEA.
Lastly, GFHD also invokes Univ. of Utah Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Twin Falls Cty., 122 Idaho
1010, 842 P.2d 689, (1992) and Sanchez v. State, Dep't of Correction, 143 Idaho 239, 244, 141
P.3d 1108, 1113 (2006). Def. Br. at 35. Univ. of Utah Hosp. & Med. Ctr. involved the waiver of
medical bills in a county hospital for a medical indigent under I.C. § 31–3504 and a claim for
prejudgment interest. Id. at 1012, 842 P.2d at 691. Sanchez involved an appeal from the Idaho
Personnel Commission for attorney’s fees and also a claim for prejudgment interest under I.C. §
12-117 and Former Rule 201. Id. at 244, 141 P.3d at 1113. (2006). Both courts carefully reserved
their rulings to the issue of prejudgment interest only. In the context of the IPPEA in this particular
case, Smith concedes that there is not a basis under I.C. § 28-22-104(1) for prejudgment interest,
because money wasn’t “due” or “certain” until the jury’s verdict was delivered in February 2018.
Because Smith does not seek prejudgment interest, the decisions in Univ. of Utah Hosp. & Med.
Ctr. and Sanchez do not apply.
However, the legal rate of interest post-judgment is sufficiently clear and applicable under
I.C. § 28-22-104(2) and the IPPEA from the date of the jury’s Special Verdict. The Red Steer
decision is dispositive, and Smith must be allowed interest on her judgment. Furthermore, because
judgment should have been entered “without delay” pursuant to I.R.C.P 58, judgment nunc pro
tunc to the date of the completion of trial is required. Otherwise, Smith will unfairly suffer the
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costs associated with the loss of her use of money during the pendency of GFHD’s post-verdict
motions and this appeal.
E. Smith’s Contractual Rate for Attorney’s Fees on a Contingent Fee Are Objectively
Reasonable and Necessary As a Component of “Actual Damages” Under the IPPEA
In response to GFHD’s argument regarding the award of attorney’s fees, it is clear that
there is very little in dispute:
•

GFHD does not take issue with the district court’s conclusion that “Plaintiff is prevailing
party, the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor and awarded substantial damages.” R.
Vol. I, p. 765; see also Def. Br. at 39 (“district court properly exercised its discretion in
determining the attorney’s fee award.”)

•

GFHD does not dispute that Smith, as prevailing party, is entitled to reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs as a component of “actual damages” pursuant to I.C. § 6-2105(1). See Def.
Br. at 7 (“Finally, the district court awarded Smith attorney’s fees pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 6-2105(1) in the amount of $168,177.00.”)

•

All parties agree that the bottom line in an award for attorney’s fees is “reasonableness.”
See Def. Br. at 39 (“The purpose of an attorney fee award is to provide ‘the prevailing party
a fund from which to pay a reasonable fee. . . .”)

•

GFHD does not object to the hours Plaintiff’s counsel expended in pursuit of her claim,
and the district court found that the number of hours billed are reasonable. R. Vol. I, p.
765–66.
The only dispute is the manner in which the district court analyzed the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)

factors to supports its conclusion that “it does not agree that $400 is a reasonable hourly rate in
this case.” R. Vol. I, p. 768 (emphasis added); see also R. Vol. I, p. 769; Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 97. It
is therefore necessary to evaluate what caused the district court to reduce the rates of Plaintiff’s
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counsel from $400.00 to $325.00, and $175.00 to $150.00, respectively. Smith asserts that the
Court abused its discretion by not awarding all of the hours necessarily incurred and reducing
Counsel’s hourly rate citing factors that should support higher rates. The district court did not
reach its decision in accordance with the I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(3) factors:
[I]n the absence of a clear explanation from the trial court, we will find an abuse of
discretion when a trial court acknowledges the governing legal standard and arrives
at a decision that appears to be incongruent with the application of that standard.
H2O Envtl., Inc. v. Farm Supply Distributors, Inc., 164 Idaho 295, 429 P.3d 183, 188 (2018).
1. Rule 54(e)(3)(A): Time and Labor
GFHD erroneously states that the district court “upheld the number of hours requested by
Smith.” Def. Br. at 40. However, the Court did not award any attorney’s fees for Plaintiff’s counsel
after February 13, 2018. See R. Vol. I, p. 558. The Jury Verdict was filed February 9, 2018. R.
Vol. I, p. 527. Smith submitted her Motion for Costs and Attorney’s Fees on February 28, 2018,
assuming the Judgment would be entered promptly as required by I.R.C.P. Rule 58. The
Memorandum of Costs requested 410.5 hours for Jeffrey J. Hepworth, 204.23 hours for J. Grady
Hepworth, 52.5 hours in administrative and paralegal time. R. Vol. I, p. 544–58 (total 667.23
billable hours). Smith attached an attorney’s fee ledger detailing every hour up until February 13,
2018. Id. Smith’s Memorandum estimated an additional $10,000.00 in attorney’s fees would be
incurred for post-trial motions. R. Vol. I, p. 541, ¶ 7.
Unfortunately, the district court did not enter Judgment “without delay” as required under
Rule 58, and instead ordered additional briefing to address GFHD’s Motion on the Verdict. When
the district court awarded attorney’s fees, it disallowed any attorney’s fees after February 13, 2018.
The district court’s attorney’s fees award did not take into account the updated attorney’s fees
ledger Smith submitted on May 11, 2018, R. Vol. I, p. 706–18. Smith submitted a third attorney’s
fee ledger on June 7, 2018 in support of Smith’s Motion for Post Judgment Relief. R. Vol. I, p.
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813–826. Due to GFHD’s untimely motion and improper procedure, Smith’s counsel was required
to expend more than 147.8 additional hours of labor on post-trial briefing and oral arguments
through June 6, 2018. R. Vol. I. p. 826 (“815.03 total billable hours”). The district court denied
Smith’s request for additional attorney’s fees in the final Memorandum Decision and Order. Supp.
R. Vol. I, p. 27. Therefore, Smith has not been reimbursed for all hours spent before the district
court, notwithstanding the additional hours necessary on appeal. In denying Smith’s full number
of hours spent, the district court abused its discretion.
2. Rule 54(e)(3)(B): Novelty and Difficulty of Questions
GFHD argued and the district court improperly concluded that Smith’s claim “did not turn
on any particularly novel or difficult issues.” See Def. Br. at 40; R. Vol. I, p. 766–67. Smith objects,
and notes that both the subject-matter of the trial itself—as well as the post-judgment briefing—
required substantial legal research and addressed several novel issues of law and fact. In general,
claims under the IPPEA require substantial legal knowledge, as the plaintiff’s claims must apply
cleanly under the statutory definitions of “protected activities” and “adverse actions.” See
generally I.C. §§ 2103, 2104. Plaintiffs face difficult hurdles in order to overcome the burden of
the “at-will” employment doctrine in Idaho. For example, Smith defended a lengthy and complex
motion for summary judgment that addressed novel legal doctrines, such as the “cat’s paw” theory
of liability, as well the unresolved standard of causation under the IPPEA. See generally R. Vol.
I, p. 128–51. At trial, Smith faced difficult strategic decisions, and was required to prove her claim
using a majority of witnesses that were still employed by GFHD. Post-trial, Smith faced hotly
contested issues, which included the scope of Art. I, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution, the distinction
between “actions at law” and “suits in equity,” the wrong-doers burden of future damages, as well
as a highly nuanced statutory interpretation of the IPPEA. The novelty and difficulty of Smith’s
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claim required experienced counsel to handle properly, and Smith has had to fight tooth and nail
against experienced and skilled defense counsel on every issue.
3. Rule 54(e)(3)(C): Skill Requisite to Perform the Legal Service and Ability of Attorney
Neither GFHD nor the district court appeared to dispute Mr. Jeffrey J. Hepworth’s
extensive experience, skill, or ability. Jeffrey J. Hepworth has been practicing law in the State of
Idaho since 1985. R. Vol. I, p. 540. Mr. Jeffrey Hepworth has extensive trial experience, and has
successfully litigated over nine hundred disputes in his career, including several appeals before the
Idaho Supreme Court. Id. Attorney J. Grady Hepworth was a first-year attorney at the time of trial,
however J. Grady Hepworth is the beneficiary of a successful academic career, as well as highly
educational intern experiences with the Idaho Supreme Court, Federal District Court for the
District of Idaho, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 541. Regarding the actual ability
of Smith’s attorneys, Smith avers that the result of the trial speaks for itself.
4. Rule 54(e)(3)(D): Prevailing Charges for Like Work
Smith maintains that among the most arbitrary aspect of the district court’s attorney’s fee
award was that the court essentially ignored the fact the hourly rates charged were entirely
consistent with market rates in the applicable geographic region for similar work:
Although the Court does not dispute that other Boise attorneys have charged similar
fees under a variety of circumstances, it does not agree that $400.00 is a reasonable
hourly rate in this case.
R. Vol. I, p. 768 (emphasis added). The district court’s acknowledgement that plaintiff’s counsel’s
fee was in line with the prevailing market rate, and therefore reasonable, should have been
dispositive. More persuasive still, Smith submitted the earlier decision of the district court, which
concluded that such rates for less experienced counsel in an IPPEA claim were reasonable as a
matter of law. See Vol. I, p. 691 (Rate of $425 and $375 “reasonable in light of counsels’
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significant experience.”) The district court’s contradiction is the definition of arbitrary and
capricious, and therefore an abuse of discretion.
Equally arbitrary and capricious was the district court’s reduction of J. Grady Hepworth’s
hourly rate from $175.00 to $150.00. The district court provided no analysis whatsoever regarding
the justification for reducing J. Grady Hepworth’s rate. Notably, the district court in Eller approved
plaintiffs’ rate billed by “paralegals and law clerks” at a rate of $100 to $120 per hour. R. Vol. I,
p. 692. Although in his first year of practice, J. Grady Hepworth’s services were utilized in order
to reduce costs for the litigants, and Mr. Hepworth demonstrated adequate skill drafting the
majority of Smith’s opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as
completing opening statements, the direct examination of expert Susan Langley, and the crossexamination of Commissioner Harley Riggs. The district court failed to provide any discussion on
the decision to reduce Mr. J. Grady Hepworth’s hourly rate, or how the district court arrived at the
rate of $150.00 per hour. The district court’s award was less than GFHD even asked for, as GFHD
provided the conclusory acknowledgement that a first-year associate’s rate “is probably closer to
the range of $125 to $165.” R. Vol. I, p. 583. The term “probably closer” in GFHD’s brief infers
a lack of personal knowledge, and Smith’s counsel later contradicted itself by stating it bills its
associates at a rate of $200.00 per hour. See R. Vol. I, p. 582. Similarly, the district court in Eller
v. Idaho State Police awarded $200.00 for attorneys with up to ten years of experience. R. Vol. I,
p. 693. J. Grady Hepworth, a junior partner, was therefore charging less than GFHD’s counsel
charges for the work of its own associates, and what the district court awarded attorneys with
similar experience in Eller. Id. To award less than an otherwise reasonable rate is an abuse of
discretion.
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5. Rule 54(e)(3)(E): Fixed or Contingent Fee
Smith objects to GFHD’s absurd and meritless argument that “the fee agreement between
Smith and her attorney is not a typical contingent fee agreement. . . .” Def. Br. at 41. The contract
attached as an exhibit is clearly “contingent,” and GFHD’s argument to the contrary is without any
foundation or legal basis:
2. This is a contingent fee agreement whereby the client only pays attorney fees if
a recovery of money is made by settlement or obtaining a judgment after
commencement of a trial. If no recovery is made, no attorney fees are owed.
R. Vol. I, p. 559 (emphasis added). GFHD notes that in paragraph 2(B) of Smith’s fee agreement,
Smith agrees to pay as attorney’s fees “40% of the gross amount of all sums received OR $400.00
per hour for all work done by attorney, whichever is greater.” Id; see also Def. Br. at 41. However,
GFHD dishonestly omits the very next sentence in that paragraph:
B. COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL: In the event this dispute is resolved after
commencement of a trial, client agrees to pay as attorney fees 40% of the gross
amount of all sums received OR $400.00 per hour for all work done by attorney,
whichever is greater. If no recovery is made, no attorney fee is owed.
Id. (emphasis added).
Clearly, if defense counsel had been successful, there would have been no recovery and
Smith’s lawyers would not get paid anything. The word “contingent” means winning is a condition
of getting paid. Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) at 362 “contingency fee” (“a fee charged
for a lawyer’s services only if the lawsuit is successful or is favorably settled out of court.”) It has
nothing to do with the amount paid.
In addition to the requirement of winning, the timing of receiving payment is always
delayed. The work is done knowing that if payment is received, it will be far in the future. It could
be six months or six years from the time of commencing a lawsuit before recovery is made, if at
all. As a result of the very risky nature of “contingent” contracts, it is natural that increased risk
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will only be undertaken if there is the prospect of a commensurate reward. The increased rate is
commonly referred to as the “risk premium.” Insurance defense attorneys routinely charge lower
hourly rates because of the lack of risk, volume of work, and predictable cash flow. The opposite
is true of plaintiff’s lawyers operating under a contingent fee. Plaintiffs lawyers must charge much
higher rates because their clients are typically not repeat customers, meaning there is high risk and
the volume of business is low. Lawyers operating under a contingent fee don’t get paid anything
when they lose, and when they do get paid, it might be years after the legal representation and
work was initiated.
This Court recognizes that attorneys working under a contingent fee agreement is a benefit
to our judicial system as a whole. From the client’s perspective, hiring an attorney can be a
financially devastating event. A contingent fee arrangement allows the client to pursue justice
without fear of bankruptcy:
In whatever clothing, contingent fee arrangements have long and well served the
purpose of gaining legal representation for those who might otherwise have no
representation.
Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796, 807, 606 P.2d 90, 101 (1980). A contingent fee also has the
desired result of forcing attorneys to weed out non-meritorious cases, and only accept claims that
will result in a plaintiff’s verdict. However, the risk is nevertheless on the attorney, who may work
without pay in the end. Given these considerations, Smith’s counsel’s rate is objectively reasonable
when considering the risk.
6. Rule 54(e)(3)(F): Time Limitations Imposed by the Client or the Circumstances of the
Case
Neither GFHD, nor the district court, addressed the time limitations involved in an IPPEA
claim, and this case in particular. Failure to consider the necessary factor amounts to an abuse of
discretion.
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Under the IPPEA, a plaintiff must file her claim within one-hundred eighty (180) days from
the date of the adverse action at issue. I.C. § 6-2105(2). Such a short claim period requires
responsive representation, as well as artful initial pleadings and legal skill. Furthermore, in this
case, Smith’s counsel was required to complete extensive post-trial legal briefing on very
important and novel legal issues during a less-than two-week period following GFHD’s March 7,
2018 Motion on the Verdict. See R. Vol. I, p. 585 (Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition filed
March 16, 2018). Smith was thereafter required to submit an entire Memorandum of Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law within the fourteen-day period following Judgment pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 59, 60. These are factors the district court failed to consider in its decision, and which
support Smith’s claim for attorney’s fees at her contractual rate.
7. Rule 54(e)(3)(G): Amount Involved and Results Obtained
Smith obtained a strong jury verdict reflecting Smith’s loss of a good full-time job with
benefits. Smith’s jury verdict for $250,543.02 is consistent with Smith’s pre-trial offer to settle for
$275,000.00 plus attorney’s fees. R. Vol. I, p. 543. Even the district court’s reduced verdict is
significantly greater than the $50,000.01 Offer of Judgment GFHD made on September 22, 2017.
It is undisputed that Smith was the prevailing party, and is entitled to costs as a matter of right
under the IPPEA.
8. Rule 54(e)(3)(H): Undesirability of the Case
From a purely business perspective, Smith’s case was highly undesirable for plaintiff’s
counsel. Smith was working as a part-time employee with limited income at the time she was fired,
and unemployed at the time she retained counsel. There was no way Smith could afford to pay any
attorney by the hour on a monthly basis, regardless of the hourly rate. Clients who can’t pay their
bills are not desirable. There was never a realistic chance Plaintiff’s counsel would ever make
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more than $400 per hour in this case. There was a very realistic chance a jury would rule for the
defense, and the attorneys would not get paid for 800–1,200 hours of work.
Alternatively, from the perspective of “justice,” this was a desirable case for plaintiff’s
counsel. This was a case in which Smith caught her boss stealing over $6,000.00 and lost her job
as a result. It was important that the tax payers of Elmore County be informed about the theft and
the elected officials that turned a blind eye. This was a case about principles that are important,
and a case that strikes at the very heart of the legislative purpose underlying the IPPEA. See I.C. §
6-2101. Plaintiff’s counsel takes great pride in representing public employees who have the
courage to stand up for what is right, while simultaneously confronting waste, dishonesty, and
disregard for the rule of law in local government.
9. Rule 54(e)(3)(I): Nature and Length of Professional Relationship with the Client
The district court erred by failing to consider the length of Smith’s relationship with her
attorneys. The district court did not provide any analysis to this factor, and by the district court’s
own admission, stated that it was “either neutral or not applicable in this case, and thus does not
warrant specific attention or discussion.” R. Vol. I, p. 769. However, the fact that this was the first
and only time Smith has hired plaintiff’s counsel is directly relevant to whether counsel’s fee was
reasonable under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), and it was an abuse of discretion not to consider.
The nature of Smith’s relationship with her attorneys is relevant in two ways. First and
foremost, where Smith and her attorneys didn’t know each other or have a prior relationship, the
inference is that the contract Smith agreed to is reasonable given the attorney’s fee compared to
the attorneys’ skill and representation. Smith chose to enter into a contractual relationship with her
counsel as a free consumer in an open marketplace. The fact Smith chose plaintiff’s counsel at the
contractual rate demonstrates it is reasonable compared to other options on the marketplace, and
is consistent with counsel’s experience and skill.
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Second, Smith’s one-time-representation relationship is particularly relevant given the fact
the only argument GFHD expressed against Smith’s rates was its own attorneys’ rates. GFHD
argued “in fact, this firm currently bills out its most experienced shareholders at $250.00 per hour,
and associates at $200.00. . . .” R. Vol. I, p. 582. Smith primarily notes that GFHD makes this
statement without submitting an affidavit, or without actually demonstrating the rates it cites are
its actual rates. However, the difference between defense counsel retained by a public entity on a
purely hourly basis is that this is not a one-time representation. Defense counsel has a longstanding relationship with Idaho’s public entities, and represents the State of Idaho and its political
subdivisions in numerous lawsuits across the state, as well as pre-litigation consultation. Defense
counsel is paid on a monthly basis, and is essentially guaranteed a high volume of work. The State
of Idaho is a highly desirable client, and involves very little risk to represent. Whereas the only
comparative rates GFHD submitted were its own unsubstantiated rates, the district court should
have considered that it was comparing apples-to-oranges regarding the two rates. Failure to do so
was an abuse of discretion.
10. Rule 54(e)(3)(J): Awards in Similar Cases
In support of her claim for attorney’s fees, Smith submitted evidence of similar awards in
recent IPPEA claims, including an attorney’s fee award of $656,958.90 in Wright v. Ada County,
CV-OC-2013-2730 (Jan. 5, 2015), and $422,272.98 in Eller v. Idaho State Police, CV-OC-2015127 (Mar. 24, 2018). See R. Vol. I, p. 691–703. Comparatively, Smith sought attorney’s fees in
the total amount of $203,131.00 as of Smith’s Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees on February
28, 2018. R. Vol. I, p. 537. After post-trial briefing was completed, Smith attorney’s fees increased
to $244,549.00 as of June 7, 2018. Smith therefore claimed attorney’s fees approximately sixtyseven percent (67%) less than the amount actually awarded in Wright, and forty-two percent (42%)
less than was actually awarded in Eller. Id. Also notably absent from the record is the actual
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amount of fees charged by GFHD’s counsel to litigate the same dispute. One would assume that if
GFHD’s counsel charged less than Smith’s counsel, such information would be in the record.
Smith’s considerably lower claim for attorney’s fees compared to similar cases strongly supports
the reasonableness of her contractual rate, and the abuse of discretion the district court committed
by arbitrarily reducing the amount awarded.
11. Rule 54(e)(3)(K): Reasonable Cost of Automated Legal Research
Smith’s counsel was required to utilize substantial hours in automated legal research
through Westlaw. R. Vol. I, p. 544. However, Smith’s counsel does not charge additional fees or
special costs for the research, but instead, such services are included in the contractual hourly rate
counsel charges Smith. The included costs of automated legal research in plaintiff’s counsel’s
hourly rate also supports Smith’s claim that the contractual rate of services is reasonable. This was
a factor that the district court did not address directly, and therefore abused its discretion in
concluding the factor was “either neutral or not applicable in this case.” See R. Vol. I, p. 769.
12. Rule 54(e)(3)(L): Any Other Factor Which the Court Deems Appropriate
In support of Smith’s Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, Smith requested that the district
court consider the remedial nature of the IPPEA, and the legislative purpose to protect
whistleblowers and avoid public waste and disregard for the rule of law in government. See I.C. §
6-2101; see also R. Vol. I, p. 544. The award of attorney’s fees under section 6-2105 is consistent
with the IPPEA’s remedial purpose of making the victim of retaliation whole:
Weighed against this standard, Idaho’s Whistleblower statute is a remedial one. As
a result, it must be “‘liberally construed to give effect to the intent of the
Legislature.’” Eastman v. Farmers Ins. Co., 164 Idaho 10, __, 423 P.3d 431, 435
(2018) (quoting Hill v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619, 625, 249 P.3d
812, 818 (2011)). Viewing the statute liberally, we hold that the Whistleblower Act
provides such claimants with a remedy for all actual damages, based on all claims,
including those otherwise available under common law tort claims.
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Eller v. Idaho State Police, Dkt. Nos. 45698, 45699 (Idaho, May 24, 2019) (Slip Opinion at 10)
(emphasis added). The IPPEA’s definition of “damages” includes the reasonable court costs and
attorney’s fees incurred as a result of filing a civil action. I.C. § 6-2105(1). Attorney’s fees as a
component of “actual damages” infers a legislative purpose of awarding a plaintiff’s actual fees,
so long as the actual fees charged are reasonable.
GFHD makes the ill-conceived policy argument that the district court properly ignored the
terms of Smith’s attorney’s fees contract. See Def. Br. at 39 (“Awarding attorney fees solely on
the basis of the attorney-client agreement would impermissibly negate any Rule 54(e)(3)
analysis.”) GFHD entertains a classic “slippery slope” argument that if the district court considered
Smith’s contractual agreement, plaintiff’s counsel would be improperly incentivized to charge
outrageous fees, such as “$5,000 per hour.” Id. However, GFHD’s argument ignores the fact that
attorneys are ethically bound to only charge “reasonable” rates under Idaho’s Rules of Professional
Conduct:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee
or an unreasonable amount for expenses.
Idaho R.P.C. Rule 1.5(a). In drafting a fee agreement, attorneys must consider the factors
analogous to the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors. See Idaho R.P.C. Rule 1.5(a)(1)–(8). Absent proof that
an attorney’s fee agreement is unreasonable under the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, justice and fairness
would require an award under the attorney’s actual fee agreement as a component of “actual
damages.” See I.C. § 6-2105(1).
In this case, there is not a single 54(e)(3) factor that supports GFHD’s argument that
Smith’s actual fee agreement is unreasonable. Smith’s counsel is ethically bound to charge
reasonable rates, and all evidence in the record supports Smith’s argument that the hourly rates
charged by Smith’s counsel are consistent with the free market rates charged by similarly
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experienced plaintiffs attorneys. Similarly, Smith’s overall attorney’s fee award, irrespective of
the underlying lodestar calculation, is significantly less than the amount of attorney’s fees actually
awarded in other recent IPPEA claims, and presumably less than GFHD spent on its own attorney’s
fees and litigation costs. For these reasons, Smith asks that this Court vacate the district court’s
Memorandum Decision and Order and remand with instructions to enter Judgment on Smith’s
actual attorney’s fees at counsel’s reasonable contractual rate.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Smith respectfully asks that this Court vacate the district court’s
judgment and remand with an order for the district court to enter judgment on the jury verdict, plus
reasonable attorney’s fees at Smith’s counsel’s contractual rates, and interest on judgment
calculated from the date of the jury’s verdict on February 9, 2016.
DATED this 5th day of June, 2019.
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